ther God is to be feared?

(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;

(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?

(4) Whether servile fear is good?

(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?

(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?

(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?

(11) Whether it remains in heaven?

(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether God Can Be Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object
of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3).
But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore
God cannot be feared.

Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.

Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be
feared.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear
Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where
is My fear?"

_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the
future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is
someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes
for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very
evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the
evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness
itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear
in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either
from Him or in relation to Him.

From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it