duration of contemplation.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 1]

Whether the Contemplative Life Has Nothing to Do with the Affections,
and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the
intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly
regards the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.)
that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_;
Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the
vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore
the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to
the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
appetitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now
desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the
contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
appetitive power.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be
the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of
truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q.
12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the
will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of
the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive
cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which
moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as
stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1).

Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Matt. 6:21), "where thy treasu