hird
is in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is
in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent
on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The
fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by
divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be
comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and
contrary to reason"; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know
things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of
the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to
pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth
regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered
in creatures.

Obj. 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth
is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
contemplation we seek the principle which is God."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the
contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative
life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this
contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine
says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as
being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of
our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come,
when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us
perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is
competent to us imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark
manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate
beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to
come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate
happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.

Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation
of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of
God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made," it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also
belongs to t