is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies
to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains
to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is
adequately divided into active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. _Ethic._ i, 5), it is the life "of a beast."
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore
it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale
in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise
that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one
of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life
sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.

Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if
directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right
reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities
of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the
other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong
to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life.
Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of
truth belong to the contemplative life.
_______________________

QUESTION 180

OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there
are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?

(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?

(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?

(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?

(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?

(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv);

(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;

(8) Of the