ding to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that
weep, and walk with them that mourn." Again, "the heart of fools is
where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but that
they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise
man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not
lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures,
according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
brethren to dwell together in unity."

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but
because you were made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we
should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in
order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin,
and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and
show not thy countenance gay towards them."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 2]

Whether This Kind of Friendship Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3).
Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.

_I answ