FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1011   1012   1013   1014   1015   1016   1017   1018   1019   1020   1021   1022   1023   1024   1025   1026   1027   1028   1029   1030   1031   1032   1033   1034   1035  
1036   1037   1038   1039   1040   1041   1042   1043   1044   1045   1046   1047   1048   1049   1050   1051   1052   1053   1054   1055   1056   1057   1058   1059   1060   >>   >|  
at he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt. 6:16) that "they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory. Reply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly. _______________________ QUESTION 114 OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (In Two Articles) We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 1] Whether Friendliness Is a Special Virtue? Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those he loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of ple
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1011   1012   1013   1014   1015   1016   1017   1018   1019   1020   1021   1022   1023   1024   1025   1026   1027   1028   1029   1030   1031   1032   1033   1034   1035  
1036   1037   1038   1039   1040   1041   1042   1043   1044   1045   1046   1047   1048   1049   1050   1051   1052   1053   1054   1055   1056   1057   1058   1059   1060   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

virtue

 
friendliness
 
friendship
 

Philosopher

 

special

 

Whether

 

Therefore

 

Further

 
wickedly
 

affability


reason

 

speaks

 

account

 

perfect

 

inquiry

 

quarreling

 

ARTICLE

 

justice

 

Friendliness

 

Virtue


Objection
 

Concerning

 
Special
 

points

 

written

 

Eccles

 

decides

 

incompatible

 

observes

 

mourning


virtuous

 

belongs

 

wherefore

 
consequence
 

states

 

Dionysius

 

lovable

 
friend
 

pertain

 

simulation


person

 

friends

 

manner

 

flattery

 

respects

 

grievously

 

persons

 

guilty

 

boasting

 

practice