ith justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as
justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and
so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this
Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is
reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to
a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due
that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is
based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it
answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.

Reply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the
body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to
the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly
pertain to temperance.

Reply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the
fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he
gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But
the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a
certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so
that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also
to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to
justice, which is about external things.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 6]

Whether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man
is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men
abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is
the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things
that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now
the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since
"the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to
severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the
greatest of virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now
Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man
famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the
virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore libera