asure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous
of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of
friendliness is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.
Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the
congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we
mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words,
so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence
the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this
order: and this virtue is called friendliness.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his
_Ethics._ One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity (Q. 23, A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this
has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain
likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner
towards those with whom he is in contact.

Reply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain
general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every beast
loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do
not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to
us by special friendship.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where
there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy
meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to
charity": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful,
accor