general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in
relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to
all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in
this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be
essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is
general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it
is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5),
legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as
it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is
to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may
be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all
the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as
it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its
proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too
legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so
far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it
is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it
is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so
far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid
legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless
virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially
the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in
this sense that the Philosopher speaks.

Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the
virtue commanded by legal justice.

Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act
to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a
further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue
considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to
that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially
distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the
common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]

Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a