tion
of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is
the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are
vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such
like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to
another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so
that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our
regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice
consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external
thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between
greater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf.
_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

Reply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore
justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.
First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good;
and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply
in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through
being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil
through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it
is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who
can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is
about things that are good simply.

Reply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a
prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each
injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and
this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 11]

Whether the Act of Justice Is to Render to Each One His Own?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render
to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to
justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we
give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice
does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which
we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it
pertains to liberality to