gs, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to
him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of
its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may
happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not
unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the
operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species
and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in
things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and
the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that
which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for
instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is
unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but
only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is
unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly,
this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the
operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a
passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice,
for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's
complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a
habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit
is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust
intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which
sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man
may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without
having the habit of injustice.

Reply Obj. 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and
formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from
choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the
sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

Reply Obj. 3: The object of temperance is not something established
externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance,
i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man
himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be
said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner
neither can it be called intemperate: and in this