ne inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest,
he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex.
22:20; Lev. 20; Deut. 13, 17].

Reply Obj. 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as
the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not
usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have
been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.

Reply Obj. 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of
the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a
judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which
gives a judgment its coercive force.
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QUESTION 61

OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will
be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And
since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we
must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and
distributive justice; (2) restitution.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
commutative?

(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?

(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?

(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
counter-passion?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 1]

Whether Two Species of Justice Are Suitably Assigned, Viz.
Commutative and Distributive?

Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and
because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De
Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to
expect that he will receive again." Therefore