ction he has
infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary
commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another
man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much
greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize
passion and action in commutations according to a certain
proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented.
Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but
there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in
distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing
and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression
_contrapassum_), but according to proportion between things and
persons, as stated above (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with
the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are
apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.

Reply Obj. 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his
services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive,
justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not
between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing
received by one person and the thing received by another according to
the respective conditions of those persons.

Reply Obj. 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is
aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence
it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a
difference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing.
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QUESTION 62

OF RESTITUTION
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:

(1) Of what is it an act?

(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what
one has taken away?

(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?

(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?

(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from
whom something has been taken?

(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to
restore it?

(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?

(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]

Whether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitu