other person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to
things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in
their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt
by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or
dishonored by injurious words.

Reply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to
whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing,
when the latter receives so much the more according as he received
less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative
justice.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]

Whether Restitution of What Has Been Taken Away Is Necessary for
Salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what
has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary
for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has
been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does
not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.

Obj. 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for
salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is
impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one
has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it
is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.

Obj. 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man
loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that
which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it
is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

Obj. 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is
seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little
is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher
says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a
benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the
benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is
not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a
man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."

_I answer that,_ Restitution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of
commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore
restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly t