prevents its being conferred
on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one
is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the
circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a
prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man
had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many
ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had
already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue
cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had
deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would
be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his
means.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 3]

Whether It Suffices to Restore the Exact Amount Taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the
exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall
steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five
oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound
to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is
bound to restore four- or fivefold.

Obj. 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written for
our learning" (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Luke 19:8) to our Lord:
"If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold."
Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he
has taken unjustly.

Obj. 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not
bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the
amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is
bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the
exact amount.

_On the contrary,_ Restitution re-establishes equality where an
unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by
repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to
restore more than the exact amount taken.

_I answer that,_ When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two
things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the
thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the
case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent
with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to
use violence but fails.

As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitut