rmany's note
to the Allies and the Chancellor's address.

The world was astonished and surprised at the German move but no one
knew whether it was to be taken seriously. Great Britain instructed
her embassies and legations in neutral countries to attempt to find out
whether the Chancellor really desired to make peace or whether his
statements were to be interpreted as something to quiet internal
troubles.

During the days of discussion which followed I was in close touch with
the Foreign Office, the American Embassy and the General Staff. The
first intimation I received that Germany did not expect the peace plan
to succeed was on December 14th at a meeting of the neutral
correspondents with Lieut. Col. von Haeften. When von Hindenburg
became Chief of the General Staff he reorganised the press department
in Berlin and sent von Haeften from his personal staff to Berlin to
direct the press propaganda. As a student of public opinion abroad von
Haeften was a genius and was extremely frank and honest with the
correspondents.

"We have proposed peace to our enemies," he said to the correspondents,
"because we feel that we have been victorious and because we believe
that no matter how long the war continues the Allies will not be able
to defeat us. It will be interesting to see what effect our proposal
has upon Russia. Reports which we have received, coming from
unquestionable sources, state that internal conditions in Russia are
desperate; that food is scarce; that the transportation system is so
demoralised and that it will be at least eight months before Russia can
do anything in a military way. Russia wants peace and needs peace and
we shall see now whether she has enough influence upon England to
compel England to make peace. We are prepared to go on with the war if
the Allies refuse our proposals. If we do we shall not give an inch
without making the Allies pay such a dear cost that they will not be
able to continue."

The Foreign Office was not optimistic over the possibilities of
success; officials realised that the new Lloyd-George Cabinet meant a
stronger war policy by Great Britain, but they thought the peace
proposals might shake the British confidence in the new government and
cause the overthrow of Lloyd-George and the return of Asquith and
Viscount Edward Grey.

From all appearances in Berlin it was evident to every neutral diplomat
with whom I talked that while Germany was proclaiming to the whol