to work together, but
this was not as successful as it might have been. During May, June and
July the submarine warfare was practically given up as the losses of
ships during those months will show. There was a steep decline from a
quarter of a million tons in April to less than 140,000 tons in May,
about 125,000 tons in June and not much more than 100,000 tons in July.

During these three months the Navy was being bitterly criticised for
its inactivity. But as the events six months later will show the
German navy simply used these months to prepare for a much stronger
submarine campaign which was to begin in August. By this time it was
decided, however, not to risk a submarine campaign off the Allied
coasts but to operate in the Atlantic, off the coasts of Spain and
Norway. This method of submarine warfare proved very successful and by
November, 1916, Germany was sinking over 425,000 tons of ships per
month.

During this swell in the success of the submarine campaign the U-53 was
despatched across the Atlantic to operate off the United States coasts.

U-53 was sent here for two purposes: First, it was to demonstrate to
the American people that, in event of war, submarines could work terror
off the Atlantic coast. Second, it was to show the naval authorities
whether their plans for an attack on American shipping would be
practical. U-53 failed to terrorise the United States, but it proved
to the Admiralty that excursions to American waters were feasible.

On February 1, when the Kaiser defied the United States by threatening
all neutral shipping in European waters, Germany had four hundred
undersea boats completed or in course of construction. This included
big U-boats, like the U-53, with a cruising radius of five thousand
miles, and the smaller craft, with fifteen-day radius, for use against
England, as well as supply ships and mine layers. But not all these
were ready for use against the Allies and the United States at that
time. About one hundred were waiting for trained crews or were being
completed in German shipyards.

It was often said in Berlin that the greatest loss when a submarine
failed to return was the crew. It required more time to train the men
than to build the submarine. According to Germany's new method of
construction, a submarine can be built in fifteen days. Parts are
stamped out in the factories and assembled at the wharves. But it
takes from sixty to ninety days to educate th