estlers in Philostratus, boldly to show
myself in this common stage, and in this tragicomedy of love, to act
several parts, some satirically, some comically, some in a mixed tone, as
the subject I have in hand gives occasion, and present scene shall require,
or offer itself.

SUBSECT. II.--_Love's Beginning, Object, Definition, Division_.

"Love's limits are ample and great, and a spacious walk it hath, beset with
thorns," and for that cause, which [4461]Scaliger reprehends in Cardan,
"not lightly to be passed over." Lest I incur the same censure, 1 will
examine all the kinds of love, his nature, beginning, difference, objects,
how it is honest or dishonest, a virtue or vice, a natural passion, or a
disease, his power and effects, how far it extends: of which, although
something has been said in the first partition, in those sections of
perturbations ([4462] "for love and hatred are the first and most common
passions, from which all the rest arise, and are attendant," as
Picolomineus holds, or as Nich. Caussinus, the _primum mobile_ of all other
affections, which carry them all about them) I will now more copiously
dilate, through all his parts and several branches, that so it may better
appear what love is, and how it varies with the objects, how in defect, or
(which is most ordinary and common) immoderate, and in excess, causeth
melancholy.

Love universally taken, is defined to be a desire, as a word of more ample
signification: and though Leon Hebreus, the most copious writer of this
subject, in his third dialogue make no difference, yet in his first he
distinguisheth them again, and defines love by desire. [4463]"Love is a
voluntary affection, and desire to enjoy that which is good. [4464]Desire
wisheth, love enjoys; the end of the one is the beginning of the other;
that which we love is present; that which we desire is absent." [4465]"It
is worth the labour," saith Plotinus, "to consider well of love, whether it
be a god or a devil, or passion of the mind, or partly god, partly devil,
partly passion." He concludes love to participate of all three, to arise
from desire of that which is beautiful and fair, and defines it to be "an
action of the mind desiring that which is good." [4466]Plato calls it the
great devil, for its vehemency, and sovereignty over all other passions,
and defines it an appetite, [4467]"by which we desire some good to be
present." Ficinus in his comment adds the word fair to this definition