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. Love is a desire of enjoying that which is good and fair. Austin dilates this common definition, and will have love to be a delectation of the heart, [4468]"for something which we seek to win, or joy to have, coveting by desire, resting in joy." [4469]Scaliger _exerc. 301._ taxeth these former definitions, and will not have love to be defined by desire or appetite; "for when we enjoy the things we desire, there remains no more appetite:" as he defines it, "Love is an affection by which we are either united to the thing we love, or perpetuate our union;" which agrees in part with Leon Hebreus. Now this love varies as its object varies, which is always good, amiable, fair, gracious, and pleasant. [4470]"All things desire that which is good," as we are taught in the Ethics, or at least that which to them seems to be good; _quid enim vis mali_ (as Austin well infers) _dic mihi? puto nihil in omnibus actionibus_; thou wilt wish no harm, I suppose, no ill in all thine actions, thoughts or desires, _nihil mali vis_; [4471]thou wilt not have bad corn, bad soil, a naughty tree, but all good; a good servant, a good horse, a good son, a good friend, a good neighbour, a good wife. From this goodness comes beauty; from beauty, grace, and comeliness, which result as so many rays from their good parts, make us to love, and so to covet it: for were it not pleasing and gracious in our eyes, we should not seek. [4472]"No man loves" (saith Aristotle _9. mor. cap. 5._) "but he that was first delighted with comeliness and beauty." As this fair object varies, so doth our love; for as Proclus holds, _Omne pulchrum amabile_, every fair thing is amiable, and what we love is fair and gracious in our eyes, or at least we do so apprehend and still esteem of it. [4473] "Amiableness is the object of love, the scope and end is to obtain it, for whose sake we love, and which our mind covets to enjoy." And it seems to us especially fair and good; for good, fair, and unity, cannot be separated. Beauty shines, Plato saith, and by reason of its splendour and shining causeth admiration; and the fairer the object is, the more eagerly it is sought. For as the same Plato defines it, [4474]"Beauty is a lively, shining or glittering brightness, resulting from effused good, by ideas, seeds, reasons, shadows, stirring up our minds, that by this good they may be united and made one." Others will have beauty to be the perfection of the whole composition, [4475]"c
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