FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69  
70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   >>   >|  
ons, by a pretended vigorous internal feeling, has no force.(20) We cannot, strictly speaking, feel our independence; and we do not always perceive the causes, frequently imperceptible, on which our resolution depends. It is as if a needle touched with the loadstone were sensible of and pleased with its turning toward the north. For it would believe that it turned itself, independently of any other cause, not perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic matter."(21) Thus, he seems to represent the doctrine of liberty as a mere dream and delusion of the mind, and the iron scheme of necessity as a stern reality. Is it in the power of Leibnitz, then, any more than it was in that of Descartes, to reconcile such a scheme with the free-agency and accountability of man? Let us hear him and determine. Leibnitz repudiates the notion of liberty given by Hobbes and Locke. In his "Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain," a work in which he combats many of the doctrines of Locke, the insignificance of his idea of the freedom of the will is most clearly and triumphantly exposed. Philalethe, or the representative of Locke, says: "Liberty is the power that a man has to do or not to do an action _according to his will_." Theophile, or the representative of Leibnitz, replies: "If men understood only that by liberty, when they ask whether the will is free, their question would be truly absurd." And again: "The question ought not to be asked," says Philalethe, "if the will is free: that is to speak in a very improper manner: but if man is free. This granted, I say that, when any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, prefer the existence of one action to the non-existence of that action and to the contrary, that is to say, when he can make it exist or not exist, _according to his will_, then he is free. _And we can scarcely see how it could be possible to conceive a being more free than one who is capable of doing what he wills._" Theophile rejoins: "When we reason concerning the liberty of the will, we do not demand if the man can do what he wills, but if he has a sufficient independence in the will itself; we do not ask if he has free limbs or elbow-room, but if the mind is free, and in what that freedom consists."(22) Having thus exploded the delusive notion of liberty which Locke had borrowed from Hobbes, Leibnitz proceeds to take what seems to be higher ground. He expressly declares, that in order to constitute man
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69  
70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

liberty

 

Leibnitz

 
action
 

question

 

scheme

 

existence

 

Theophile

 

notion

 

Philalethe

 

representative


freedom
 

Hobbes

 

independence

 

granted

 

improper

 

manner

 

feeling

 

direction

 

vigorous

 

scarcely


contrary

 

choice

 

prefer

 

internal

 

speaking

 

understood

 

strictly

 

absurd

 

borrowed

 
delusive

exploded

 
Having
 

proceeds

 

declares

 

constitute

 

expressly

 

higher

 

ground

 

consists

 

capable


pretended

 

conceive

 

rejoins

 

sufficient

 

demand

 

reason

 

replies

 
pleased
 

turning

 

reality