es the
very positions in regard to the rebellion of Satan which his opponents
have always felt constrained to adopt in regard to the transgression of
man. What then, on Calvin's own principles, becomes of the omnipotence of
God? Does this extend merely to man and not to Satan? Is it not evident
that Calvin's scheme in regard to the sin of the first man, is here most
emphatically condemned out of his own mouth? Does he not here endorse the
very consequence which his adversaries have been accustomed to deduce from
his scheme of predestination, namely, that it makes God the author of sin?

This scheme of doctrine, it must be confessed, is not without its
difficulties. It clothes man, as he came from the hand of his Maker, with
the glorious attributes of freedom; but to what end? Is this attribute
employed to account for the introduction of sin into the world? Is it
employed to show that man, and not God, is the author of moral evil? It is
sad to reflect that it is not. The fall of man is referred to the direct
"omnipotence of God." The feeble creature yields to the decree and power
of the Almighty, who, because he does so, kindles into the most fearful
wrath and dooms him and all his posterity to temporal, spiritual, and
eternal death. Such is the doctrine which is advanced, in order to secure
the omnipotence of God, and to exalt his sovereignty. But is it not a
great leading feature of deism itself, that it exalts the power of God at
the expense of his infinite moral perfections? So we have understood the
matter; and hence, it seems to us, that Christian divines should be more
guarded in handling the attribute of omnipotence. "The rigid theologians,"
says Leibnitz, "have held the greatness of God in higher estimation than
his goodness, the latitudinarians have done the contrary; _true orthodoxy
has these two perfections equally at heart_. The error which abases the
greatness of God should be called _anthropomorphism_, and _despotism_ that
which divests him of his goodness."(66)

If Calvin's doctrine be true, God is not the author of sin, inasmuch as he
made man pure and upright; but yet, by the same power which created him,
has he plunged him into sin and misery. Now, if the creation of man with a
sinful nature be inconsistent with the infinite purity of God, will it not
be difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in man,
after his creation, by an act of the divine omnipotence?

If we ask, How can Go