without
comprehending, as part of the definition, a _necessary connexion_ with its
effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by
the definition, and I shall readily give up the whole controversy."(48)
This is the philosopher who has so often told us, that events are
"conjoined, not connected."

The motives of volition given, for example, and the volition invariably
and inevitably follows. How then, may we ask, can a man be accountable for
his volitions, over which he has no power, and in which he exerts no
power? This question has not escaped the attention of Mr. Hume. Let us see
his answer. He admits that liberty "is essential to morality."(49) For "as
actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are
indications of the internal character, passions, and affections, it is
impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, when they
proceed, not from these principles, but are derived altogether from
external violence." It is true, as we have seen, that if our external
actions, the motions of the body, proceed not from our volitions, but from
external violence, we are not responsible for them. This is conceded on
all sides, and has nothing to do with the question. But suppose our
external actions are inevitably connected with our volitions, and our
volitions as inevitably connected with their causes, how can we be
responsible for either the one or the other? This is the question which
Mr. Hume has evaded and not fairly met.

Mr. Hume's notion about cause and effect has been greatly extended by its
distinguished advocate, Dr. Thomas Brown; whose acuteness, eloquence, and
elevation of character, have given it a circulation which it could never
have received from the influence of its author. Almost as often as divines
have occasion to use this notion, they call it the doctrine of Dr. Brown,
and omit to notice its true atheistical paternity and origin.

The defenders of this doctrine are directly opposed, in regard to a
fundamental point, to all other necessitarians. Though they deny the
existence of all power and efficacy, they still hold that human volitions
are necessary; while other necessitarians ground their doctrine on the
fact, that volitions are produced by the most powerful, the most
efficacious motives. They are not only at war with other necessitarians,
they are also at war with themselves. Let us see if this may not be
clearly shown.

According to the sche