tempt to
vindicate the dogma in question. "The Arminians," says he, "ridicule the
distinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly
expressed, the distinction between the decree and law of God; because we
say he may decree one thing and command another. And so, they argue, we
hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of his contradicted another.
However, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that
there is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute
about it. We and they know it was God's secret will, that Abraham should
not sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do
it."(79) Such is the instance produced by this acute divine, to show that
the secret will of God may prefer the very thing which is condemned by his
revealed will or law; and on the strength of it, he is bold to say, "We
_know_ it, so that _it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it_."

We have often seen this passage of Scripture produced by infidels, to show
that the Old Testament contains unworthy representations of God. If
Edwards had undertaken to refute the infidel ground in relation to this
passage, he might have done so with very great ease: but then he would at
the same time have refuted himself. The Scriptural account of God's
commanding Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, was long ago employed by the
famous infidel Hobbes to show that there are two wills in God. This
argument of Hobbes has been refuted by Leibnitz. "Hobbes contends," says
Leibnitz, "that God wills not always what he commands, as when he commands
Abraham to sacrifice his son;" and he replies, that "God, in commanding
Abraham to sacrifice his son, _willed the obedience, and not the action_,
which he prevented after having the obedience; for that was not an action
which merited in itself to be willed: but such is not the case with those
actions which he positively wills, and which are indeed worthy of being
the objects of his will; such as piety, charity, and every virtuous action
which God commands, and such as the avoidance of sin, more repugnant to
the divine perfections than any other thing. It is incomparably better,
therefore, to explain the will of God, as we have done it in this
work."(80) It is evident that Leibnitz did not relish the idea of two
wills in God; and perhaps few pious minds would do so, if it were
presented to them by an atheist. But there was too close an affinity
betwee