n his eyes, in order to seeing; his
aiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the effect of his
will, does not break the connexion, or hinder the success."

"So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of
the necessity of events by a certainty of connexion and consequence: on
the contrary, it is truly forcible against the _Arminian_ doctrine of
contingence and self-determination, which is inconsistent with such a
connexion. If there be no connexion between those events wherein virtue
and vice consist, and anything antecedent; then there is no connexion
between these events and any means or endeavours used in order to them:
and if so, then those means must be in vain. The less there is of
connexion between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less
there is between means and end, endeavours and success; and in the same
proportion are means and endeavours ineffectual and in vain."

In like manner, Dr. Chalmers, in his defence of the doctrine of necessity,
has in all his illustrations confounded the connexion between a volition
and its antecedent, with the relation between a volition and its
consequent. To select one such illustration from many, it would be idle,
says he, for a man to labour and toil after wealth, if there were no fixed
connexion between such exertion and the accumulation of riches.

We reply to all such illustrations,--It is true, there must be a fixed
connexion between our endeavours or voluntary exertions and their
consequences, in order to render such endeavours or exertions of any
avail, or to render us accountable for such consequences. But it should be
forever borne in mind, that the question is not whether a fixed connexion
obtains between our volitions and their _sequents_, but whether a
necessary connexion exists between our volitions and their antecedents.
The question is, not whether the will be a power which is often followed
by necessitated effects; but whether there be a power behind the will by
which its volitions are necessitated. And this being the question, what
does it signify to tell us, that the will is a producing power? We deny
that volitions and their antecedents are necessarily connected; and our
opponents refute us by showing that volitions and their sequents are thus
connected! We deny that A and B are necessarily connected; and this
position is overthrown and demolished by showing that B and C are thus
connected! Is it not truly w