d may choose sin and bring it to pass, without
contracting the least impurity, because his _intention is directed
aright_, to a wise and good end, may we not be permitted to imitate his
example? And again, if God thus employs the creature as an instrument to
accomplish his wise and holy purposes, why should he pour out the vials of
his wrath upon him for having yielded to the dispensations of his almighty
power? In order to save his doctrine from reproach, Edwards has invented a
distinction, which next demands our attention. "There is no
inconsistence," says he, "in supposing that God may hate a thing as it is
in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will
it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is
no person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is certain
that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and
extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events,
that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so,
it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise Being, who always
chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And
if so, then such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if
so, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise
and holy Providence. Men do _will_ sin as sin, and so are the authors and
actors of it; they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God
does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be
his pleasure so to order things that, he permitting, sin will come to
pass, for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the
consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass
for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate
evil as evil; and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably
forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such."(78) Here we are plainly told,
that although God hates sin as sin, yet, all things considered, he prefers
that it should come to pass, and even helps it into existence. But man
loves and commits evil _as such_, and is therefore justly punishable for
it.

There are several serious objections to this extraordinary distinction. It
is not true that men love and commit sin _as sin_. Sin is committed, not
for its own sake, but for the pleasure which attends it. If sin did not
gratify the appetites, o