eally have the power to do so.

We shall not stop to pull this scheme to pieces. We shall only remark,
that it is a pity the philosopher undertook to counteract the benevolent
design of the Deity, and to expose the cheat and delusion by which he
intended to govern the world for its benefit. But the author himself, it
is but just to add, had the good sense and candour to renounce his own
scheme; and hence we need dwell no longer upon it. It remains at the
present day only as a striking example of the frightful contortions of the
human mind, in its herculean efforts to escape from the dark labyrinth of
fate into the clear and open light of nature.

Sir James Mackintosh, though familiar with the speculations of preceding
philosophers, was satisfied with none of their solutions of the great
problem under consideration, and consequently he has invented one of his
own. This solution is founded on his theory of the moral sentiments, which
is peculiar to himself. This theory is employed to show how it is, that
although we may come by our volitions according to the scheme of
necessity, yet we do not perceive the causes by which they are necessarily
produced, and consequently imagine that we are free. Thus, the "feeling of
liberty," as he calls it, is resolved into an illusory judgment, and the
scheme of necessity is exhibited in all its adamantine strength. "It seems
impossible," says he, "for reason to consider occurrences otherwise than
as bound together by the connexion of cause and effect; and in this
circumstance consists the strength of the necessitarian system."(56)

We shall offer only one remark on this extraordinary hypothesis. If the
theory of Sir James were true, it could only show, that although our
volitions are necessarily caused, we do not perceive the causes by which
they are produced. But this fact has never been denied: it has always been
conceded, that we ascertain the existence of efficient causes, excepting
the acts of our minds, only by means of the effects they produce. Both
Leibnitz and Edwards long ago availed themselves of this undisputed fact,
in order to account for the belief which men entertain in regard to their
internal freedom. "Thus," says Edwards, "I find myself possessed of my
volitions before I can see the effectual power and efficacy of any cause
to produce them, _for the power and efficacy of the cause are not seen but
by the effect, and this, for aught I know, may make some imagine that