public grounds now openly assail you, while those whose
authority, rank, and policy you had defended, are not so much mindful of
your kindness as enemies to your reputation. In these circumstances, as
I wrote you word before, I perceive that Hortensius is very warmly your
friend, Lucullus anxious to serve you: while of the magistrates L.
Racilius shews special loyalty and affection. For my taking up the
cudgels for you, and advocating your claims, would seem in the eyes of
most people to be the measure of my obligation to you rather than of my
deliberate opinion. Besides these I am, in fact, not able to bear
witness to any one of the consulars shewing zeal or kindness or friendly
feeling towards you. For you are aware that Pompey, who is very
frequently accustomed, not on my instigation but of his own accord, to
confide in me about you, did not often attend the senate during these
discussions. It is true your last letter, as I could easily conceive,
was very gratifying to him. To me, indeed, your reasonableness, or
rather your extreme wisdom, seemed not only charming, but simply
admirable. For by that letter you retained your hold on a man of lofty
character, who was bound to you by the signal generosity of your conduct
towards him, but who was entertaining some suspicions that, owing to
the impression prevailing among certain persons as to his own ambitious
desires, you were alienated from him. I always thought that he wished to
support your reputation, even in that very dubious episode of Caninius's
proposal;[503] but when he had read your letter, I could plainly see
that he was thinking with his whole soul of you, your honours, and your
interests. Wherefore look upon what I am going to write as written after
frequent discussions with him, in accordance with his opinion, and with
the weight of his authority. It is this: "That, since no senatorial
decree exists taking the restoration of the Alexandrine king out of your
hands, and since the resolution written out upon that restoration
(which, as you are aware, was vetoed) to the effect that no one was to
restore the king at all,[504] has rather the weight of a measure adopted
by men in anger than of a deliberate decision of the senate--you can
yourself see, since you are in possession of Cilicia and Cyprus,[505]
what it is within your power to effect and secure; and that, if
circumstances seem to make it possible for you to occupy Alexandria and
Egypt, it is for your own