scattered columns.

Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly
by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and
partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where
the decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of the
government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly
increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger
organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system
and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional
system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of two
or three divisions, which he placed under the command of
lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the
reserve of his army.[40]

This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, where
he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had
under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry,
from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each
corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an
army. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve,
composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of
light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry
reserve. At a later period--1812--the cavalry was also organized into
corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the
constantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as near
perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such
great results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soon
imitated.

Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have
recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act
independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because
this number will allow one for the center and each wing. This would
certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two
brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades
on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot
with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with three
brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in
reserve,--a manifest advantage. But, if thirty brigades formed in ten
divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen
di