es of retreat from the points 4, 5,
and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected
three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at
Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the
Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North
Sea, and would have obtained immense results.

The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance
that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the
English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be
cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for
this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good
reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The
principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the
strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of
retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of
punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the
English as he might have done.

It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the
whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had
decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because,
when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through,
and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession,
none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the
French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse,
had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had
fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski,
assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him
vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at
Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.

I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two
important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses
of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession
and at decisive points.[54]

Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and
will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon
their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say,
the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the
center, accordi