the fourth division reformed; but this would
be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a
charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. If to
remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military
men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as
columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in two
ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry,
only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, if
the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be
difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is
scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to
employ them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable that
any European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed
lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns
of attack.

I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, of
forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be
employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable
than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would
be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation.

[Illustration: Fig. 32.]

There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento
and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions,
one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in
columns. (See Fig. 32.) This arrangement--which belongs also to the
half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the
first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him
into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may
debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in
disorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing the
leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line
with the central deployed battalion. There would thus be a
half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means
unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear
that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their
battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the
enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may