ine of battle.]

ARTICLE XLIV.

Formation and Employment of Infantry.

Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it
forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense
of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general,
the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory,
it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and
artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times
be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial
success.

We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and
the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided,
is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of
Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages
of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep
order. I will give my own opinion farther on.

There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question
now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank,
armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of
producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater
resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the
difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in
three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the
disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who
had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material
advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for
it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops
takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn
their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase
in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing
upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much
mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult
to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three:
although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks
cannot be kept properly closed.

Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd
that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He
wishes to deploy twenty