g the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg,
might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and
fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if
seriously defeated.

If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon
the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified
towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences
still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force
toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this
wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward
Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but
two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its
way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.

It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most
disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient,
although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone
remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable
advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward
Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations
of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon
Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own
communications.

When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone,
they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the
enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in
view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the
enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of
his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to
operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest
effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to
gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you
anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the
contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of
crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver
by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered
by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back
upon the sea in case of a reverse.

Applying these ideas to the