lve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate rallying the
skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the
whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three
divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there
would be twelve ranks.]

ARTICLE XLV.

Cavalry.

The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course,
somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole
army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be
so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper
moments.

The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied
greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of nations making their
people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of
horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the
Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly
inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was
pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,--a weak
brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same
reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so
much had ideas and means changed.

As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country
should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in
mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice.

The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of
motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we
must be careful lest a false application be made of this last.

Whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations of
war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of
infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to
render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the
enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered
infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient
in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats
extremely difficult.

The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon
the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's
movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned
here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be consid