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st (vol. iii., p. 216) says that, had the Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a disaster was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed. But the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any risky moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had reached Napoleon. See too Angelis' "Der Erz-Herzog Karl."] [Footnote 210: Thoumas, "Le Marechal Lannes," pp. 205, 323 _et seq._ Desvernois ("Mems.," ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz none of Napoleon's wars had the approval of France.] [Footnote 211: For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.; James, vol. iv.; as also for Gambier's failure at Rochefort. The letters of Sir Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our officers wished to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records," vol. xii.).] [Footnote 212: Captain Boothby's "A Prisoner of France," ch. iii.] [Footnote 213: For Charles's desire to sue for peace after the first battles on the Upper Danube, see Haeusser, vol. iii., p. 341; also, after Wagram, _ib._, pp. 412-413.] [Footnote 214: Napier, bk. viii., chs. ii. and iii. In the App. of vol. iii. of "Wellington's Despatches" is Napoleon's criticism on the movements of Joseph and the French marshals. He blames them for their want of _ensemble_, and for the precipitate attack which Victor advised at Talavera. He concluded: "As long as you attack good troops like the English in good positions, without reconnoitring them, you will lead men to death _en pure perte_."] [Footnote 215: An Austrian envoy had been urging promptitude at Downing Street. On June 1st he wrote to Canning: "The promptitude of the enemy has always been the key to his success. A long experience has proved this to the world, which seems hitherto not to have profited by this knowledge." On July 29th Canning acknowledged the receipt of the Austrian ratification of peace with us, "accompanied by the afflicting intelligence of the armistice concluded on the 12th instant between the Austrian and French armies." Napoleon at St. Helena said to Montholon that, had 6,000 British troops pushed rapidly up the banks of the Scheldt on the day that the expedition reached Flushing, they could easily have taken Antwerp, which was then very weakly held
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