) agree as to the confusion of their corps when
crowded together on this road. Napoleon's aim was to insure the
capture of all the enemy's cannon and stores; but his hasty orders had
the effect of blocking the pursuit on the middle road. St. Cyr sent to
headquarters for instruction; but these were now removed to Dresden;
hence the fatal delay.]

[Footnote 364: Thiers has shown that Mortier did not get the order
from Berthier to support Vandamme _until August 30th_. The same is
true of St. Cyr, who did not get it till 11.30 a.m. on that day. St.
Cyr's best defence is Napoleon's letter of September 1st to him
("Lettres inedites de Napoleon"): "That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to
have killed himself, had not a sentinel on the mountains, nor a
reserve anywhere.... I had given him positive orders to intrench
himself on the heights, to encamp his troops on them, and only to send
isolated parties of men into Bohemia to worry the enemy and collect
news." With this compare Napoleon's approving statement of August 29th
to Murat ("Corresp.," No. 20486): "Vandamme was marching on Teplitz
_with all his corps_."]

[Footnote 365: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon," September 3rd.]

[Footnote 366: Haeusser, vol. iv., p. 343, and Boyen, "Erinnerungen,"
vol. ii., pp. 345-357, for Bernadotte's suspicious delays on this day;
also Marmont, bk. xviii., for a critique on Ney. Napoleon sent for
Lejeune, then leading a division of Ney's army, to explain the
disaster; but when Lejeune reached the headquarters at Dohna, south of
Dresden, the Emperor bade him instantly return--a proof of his
impatience and anger at these reverses.]

[Footnote 367: Thornton, our envoy at Bernadotte's headquarters, wrote
to Castlereagh that that leader's desire was to spare the Swedish
corps; he expected that Bernadotte would aim at the French crown
("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 48-59). See too Boyen,
vol. ii., p. 378.]

[Footnote 368: Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter
to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol.
iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern
allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The
Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the
Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]

[Footnote 369: Thiers asserts that he had. But if so, how could the
Emperor have written to Macdonald (October 2nd) that the Silesian army
had mad