ii. At Dresden, in May,
1812, Napoleon admitted to De Pradt, his envoy at Warsaw that Russia's
lapse from the Continental System was the chief cause of war; "Without
Russia, the Continental System is absurdity."]

[Footnote 253: For the overtures of Russia and Sweden to us and their
exorbitant requests for loans, see Mr. Hereford George's account in
his careful and systematic study, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," ch.
iv. It was not till July, 1812, that we formally made peace with
Russia and Sweden, and sent them pecuniary aid. We may note here that
Napoleon, in April, 1812, sent us overtures for peace, if we would
acknowledge Joseph as King of Spain and Murat as King of Naples, and
withdraw our troops from the Peninsula and Sicily: Napoleon would then
evacuate Spain. Castlereagh at once refused an offer which would have
left Napoleon free to throw his whole strength against Russia (Garden,
vol. xiii., pp. 215, 254).]

[Footnote 254: Garden, vol. xiii., p. 329.]

[Footnote 255: Hereford George, _op. cit._, pp. 34-37. Metternich
("Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 517, Eng. ed.) shows that Napoleon had also
been holding out to Austria the hope of gaining Servia, Wallachia and
Moldavia (the latter of which were then overrun by Russian troops), if
she would furnish 60,000 troops: but Metternich resisted
successfully.]

[Footnote 256: See his words to Metternich at Dresden, Metternich's
"Mems.," vol. i., p. 152; as also that he would not advance beyond
Smolensk in 1812.]

[Footnote 257: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. i., p. 226; Stern,
"Abhandlungen," pp. 350-366; Mueffling, "Aus meinem Leben"; L'Abbe de
Pradt, "L'histoire de l'Ambassade de Varsovie."]

[Footnote 258: "Erinnerungen des Gen. von Boyen," vol. ii., p. 254.
This, and other facts that will later be set forth, explode the story
foisted by the Prussian General von dem Knesebeck in his old age on
Mueffling. Knesebeck declared that his mission early in 1812 to the
Czar, which was to persuade him to a peaceful compromise with
Napoleon, was directly controverted by the secret instructions which
he bore from Frederick William to Alexander. He described several
midnight interviews with the Czar at the Winter Palace, in which he
convinced him that by war with Napoleon, and by enticing him into the
heart of Russia, Europe would be saved. Lehmann has shown ("Knesebeck
und Schoen") that this story is contradicted by all the documentary
evidence. It may be dismissed as the offsprin