do you deem this to
be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and
dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part
of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.
MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest
manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may
be equally virtue?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice
or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.
MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.
SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and
the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.
MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole
and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to
frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that
virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and
justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing
what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by
you to be parts of virtue.
MENO: What of that?
SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature
of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but
declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue;
as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue,
and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my
dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question:
What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done
with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying
that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the
question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a
part of virtue?
MENO: No; I do not say that he can.
SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected
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