others who know that they will do them harm.

SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do
them good know that they are evils?

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods
although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the
evils to be goods they really desire goods?

MENO: Yes, in that case.

SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think
that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be
hurt by them?

MENO: They must know it.

SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are
miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

MENO: How can it be otherwise?

SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?

MENO: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

MENO: I should say not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is
no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and
possession of evil?

MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody
desires evil.

SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the
desire and power of attaining good?

MENO: Yes, I did say so.

SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to
all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

MENO: True.

SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he
must be better in the power of attaining it?

MENO: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be
the power of attaining good?

MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view
this matter.

SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another
point of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to
be the power of attaining goods?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and
the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the
state--those are what you would call goods?

MENO: Yes, I should include all those.

SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the
great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would
you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or