and allow the question 'Whether
virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,' to be argued upon
hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain
triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle (Or, whether a
certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain
circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a
hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be
such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you apply
it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the
given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to
the part produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one
consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and
therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether
this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle':--that is
a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and
qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under
a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods,
will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or
is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were
just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about
the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see
that knowledge alone is taught?
MENO: I agree.
SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue
is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of
another species?
MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.
SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis
which is not set aside.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from
knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good,
then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good
things are profitable?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?
MENO: That is the only inference.
SOCRATES: Then now let u
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