t you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you
did not know?

SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome
dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either
about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if
he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does
not know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot.
Post. Anal.).

MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?

SOCRATES: I think not.

MENO: Why not?

SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and
women who spoke of things divine that--

MENO: What did they say?

SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.

MENO: What was it? and who were they?

SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how
they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been
poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and
many others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether
their words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at
one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born
again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to
live always in perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends
the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient
crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these
are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom
and are called saintly heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being
immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all
things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has
knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able
to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about
everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all
things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning,
out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and
does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.
And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about
the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet
only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and
inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire