s see what are the things which severally profit
us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of
these, we call profitable?

MENO: True.

SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you
not think so?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable
or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and
hurtful when they are not rightly used?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are
temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory,
magnanimity, and the like?

MENO: Surely.

SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort,
are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage
wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no
sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

MENO: True.

SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of
apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are
profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?

MENO: Very true.

SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when
under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under
the guidance of folly, in the opposite?

MENO: That appears to be true.

SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be
profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of
the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are
all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly;
and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom
or prudence?

MENO: I quite agree.

SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we
were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil,
do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul
guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul
herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by
folly?

MENO: True.

SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul
wrongly.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other
things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon
wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that
which