iance.

As to the first--Marlborough's failure against Antwerp. The Spanish
Netherlands were now solidly held; the forces of the allies were indeed
increasing perpetually in this neighbourhood, but it appeared as though
the attempt to reduce Brabant, Hainault, and Flanders, which are here
the bulwark of France, would be tedious, and perhaps barren. A sort of
"consolation" advance was indeed made upon the Rhine, and Bonn was
captured; but no more was done in this quarter.

[Illustration: The General Situation in 1703.]

As to the second point, the solid occupation of the Upper Danube by the
Franco-Bavarians was indeed fully accomplished. The imperial forces were
defeated upon the bank of that river at Hochstadt, but the advance upon
Vienna failed, for the second half of the plan, the march from Northern
Italy upon Austria, through the Tyrol, had come to nothing, through the
defection of Savoy. The turning of the scale against Louis by the action
of England was beginning to have its effect; Portugal had already joined
the coalition, and now Savoy had refused to continue her help of the
Bourbons.

The year 1704 opened, therefore, with this double situation: to the south
Austria had been saved for the moment, but was open to immediate attack in
the campaign to come; meanwhile, the French had proved so solidly seated
in the Spanish Netherlands (or Belgium) that repeated attacks on them in
this quarter would in all probability prove barren.

It was under these circumstances that Eugene of Savoy came to the great
decision which marked the year of Blenheim. He determined that it was
best--if he could persuade his colleagues--to carry the war into that
territory which was particularly menaced. He conceived the plan of
marching a great force from the Netherlands right down to the field of the
Upper Danube. There could be checked the proposed march upon the heart of
the coalition, which was Vienna. There, if fortune served the allies, they
would by victory make all further chance of marching a Franco-Bavarian
force down the Danube impossible; meanwhile, and at any rate, the new step
would alarm all French effort towards the Upper Rhine, weaken the French
organisation upon its northern frontier, and so permit of a return of the
allies to an attack there at a later time.

Eugene of Savoy was a member of the cadet branch of that royal house. His
grandfather, the younger son of Charles Emmanuel, had founded the family
called