five cramped in the hollow
near a stream bed, and yet succeeding in receiving the shock of the
charge of numbers so greatly superior, and, so far from yielding, breaking
the offensive of their opponents into a confusion.

I repeat, it was but an episode, one that took place early in the day, and
apparently of no weight. But, in a general historical view of the battle,
it is of the first importance, for it showed what different stuff the
opposed cavalries were made of, and that the allied army, which was
already numerically the superior in cavalry--nearly double its
opponents--had also better mounts, better riders, and a better discipline
in that arm. A universal observer, seeing this one early detail in the
battle of Blenheim, might have prophesied that the action would be a
cavalry action as a whole, and that the cavalry of Marlborough would
decide it.

I left Cutts prepared to launch the remaining two-thirds of his force at
Blenheim village, in the hope of accomplishing what the first third had
failed to do.

The whole combined body which the French had estimated at 10,000 men, and
which seems to have been at least of some 8000, surged up in the second
attempt against the palisades of the village. Part of that line and many
of the outer gardens were carried, but the attack could not be driven
home. It was, perhaps, at this moment that Tallard sent in those extra men
which raised the French battalions in Blenheim from nine to sixteen, and
gave the defenders, behind their walls, a force equal to the attackers. At
any rate, the main attack was thrust back as the first had been, and the
great corps of men, huddled, confused, rallied here and there as best they
could be, broke from before the village.

The loss was terrible, and Marlborough having failed, not only failed, but
saw that he had failed. It was his salvation. His subordinates would have
returned to the fruitless attack with troops already shaken and dreading
the ground. Marlborough ordered a false attack to be kept up from the
further bank, upon the village, and, with that elasticity of command which
is the prime factor of tactical success, and which commonly distinguishes
youth rather than middle age in a general, turned all his efforts upon the
centre.[18]

Here the main road crosses the Nebel by a stone bridge. Four other bridges
had been thrown across at other points between this stone bridge and
Unterglauheim. By these the infantry were crossing, whi