ategic movements, a general plan
animated by a general objective. It was not a particular thrust at a
particular point, destined to achieve a highly particular result at that
point.

Armies are moved with the object of imposing political changes upon an
opponent. If that opponent accepts these changes, not necessarily after a
pitched battle, but in any other fashion, the strategical object of the
march is achieved.

Though the march conclude in a defeat, it may be strategically sound;
though it conclude in a victory, it may be strategically unsound.
Napoleon's march into Russia in 1812 was strategically sound. Had Russia
risked a great battle and lost it, the historical illusion of which I
speak would treat the campaign as a designed preface to the battle. Had
Russia risked such a battle and been successful, the historical illusion
of which I speak would call the strategy of the advance faulty.

As we know, the advance failed partly through the weather, partly through
the spirit of the Russian people, not through a general action. But in
conception and in execution the strategy of Napoleon in that disastrous
year was just as excellent as though the great march had terminated not in
disaster but in success.

Similarly, the reputation justly earned by Marlborough when he brought his
troops from the Rhine to the Danube must be kept distinct from his
tactical successes in the field at the conclusion of the effort. He was to
run a grave risk at Donauwoerth, he was to blunder badly in attacking the
village of Blenheim, he was to be in grave peril even in the last phase of
the battle, when Eugene just saved the centre with his cavalry.

Had chance, which is the major element in equal combats, foiled him at
Donauwoerth or broken his attempt at Blenheim, the march to the Danube
would still remain a great thing in history. Had Tallard refused battle on
that day, as he certainly should have done, the march to the Danube would
still deserve its great place in the military records of Europe.

* * * * *

When we have seized the fact that Marlborough's great march was but a
general strategic movement of which the action at Blenheim was the happy
but accidental close, we must next remark that the advance to the Danube
was the more meritorious, and gives the higher lustre to Marlborough's
fame as a general, from the fact that it was an attempt involving a great
military hazard, and that yet that att