ay the 4th of
August the united armies of Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria faced, in
the neighbourhood of Augsburg, the opposing armies of Marlborough and
Baden upon the further side of the Lech.
In spite of the deplorable sickness and loss among his horse, the absence
of remounts, the exhaustion of his men, the poor provisioning, and the
insecurity of the line of supply behind him, Tallard could now present
forces somewhat superior (counted by battalions and nominal
squadrons)--far superior in artillery--to the forces of the allies.
Had this reluctant and tardy advance of Tallard's on the one hand, the
ravaging of Bavaria by Baden and Marlborough on the other, between them
constituted the whole of the second phase in the preliminaries of
Blenheim, the result of the campaign might have been very different, in
spite of the impoverished condition of the Franco-Bavarian army.
But a third element, of the utmost importance, must be added: the rapid,
the secret, and the successful march of Eugene during these same days
across the northern part of these same hills which the French had just
traversed by their southern passes, and the debouching of that formidable
captain with his admirably disciplined force, especially strong in
cavalry, upon the upper valley of the Danube to reinforce Marlborough and
to decide the war.
So long as Tallard proceeded, with soldierly method, to the proper
affirmation of his line of advance and to the reduction of Villingen,
Eugene had been pinned to the neighbourhood of the Rhine.
Would Eugene, when the siege of Villingen was raised, and when Tallard had
been persuaded to that precipitous eastern move, go back to hold the line
of the Rhine against the French forces there situated, or would he decide
for the risk of detaching a large command, perhaps of leading it himself,
and of joining Marlborough? That was the doubtful factor in Tallard's
plans.
As in the case of Marlborough's own march to the Danube, either
alternative was possible. The safer course for Eugene, and that one
therefore which seemed in the eyes of his enemies the more probable, was
for him to remain on the Rhine. But it was conceivable that he would run
the risk of leading a force to the Danube; and did he so decide, the
whole business of the French remaining on the Rhine was to discover his
intention, the whole business of Eugene to hide it.
As in the case of Marlborough's march to the Danube, Eugene was led by a
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