empt had to be made in the face of
political difficulties of peculiar severity.

In other words, Marlborough was handicapped in a fashion which lends his
success a character peculiar to itself, and worthy of an especial place in
history.

This handicap may be stated by a consideration of three points which cover
its whole character.

The first of these points concerns the physical conditions of the move;
the other two are peculiar to the political differences of the allies.

It was in the nature of the move that a high hazard was involved in it.
The general had calculated, as a general always must, the psychology of
his opponent. If he were wrong in his calculation, the advance on the
Danube could but lead to disaster. It was for him to judge whether the
French were so nervous about the centre of their position upon the Rhine
as to make them cling to it to the last moment, and tend to believe that
it was either along the Moselle or (when he had left that behind) in
Alsace that he intended to attack. In other words, it was for him to make
the French a little too late in changing their dispositions, a little too
late in discovering what his real plan was, and therefore a little too
late in massing larger reinforcements upon the Upper Danube, where he
designed to be before them.

Marlborough guessed his opponent's psychology rightly; the French marshals
hesitated just too long, their necessity of communicating with Louis at
Versailles further delayed them, and the great hazard which he risked was
therefore risked with judgment. But a hazard it remained until almost the
last days of its fruition. The march must be rapid; it involved a thousand
details, each requiring his supervision and his exact calculation, his
knowledge of what could be expected of his troops, and his survey of daily
supply.

There was another element of hazard.

Arrived at his destination upon the plains of the Danube, Marlborough
would be very far from any good base of supply.

The country lying in the triangle between the Upper Danube and the Middle
Rhine, especially that part of it which is within striking distance of the
Danube, is mountainous and ill provided with those large towns, that
mobilisable wealth, and those stores of vehicles, munitions, food, and
remounts which are the indispensable sustenance of an army.

The industry of modern Germany has largely transformed this area, but even
to-day it is one in which good depots would be r