ort of flat isthmus, which
is level with the summit or nearly so.[5]

The force which, on perceiving the Duke of Marlborough's intention of
capturing Donauwoerth, the Elector of Bavaria very rapidly detached to
defend that town, was under the command of Count d'Arco; it consisted of
two regiments of cavalry and about 10,000 infantry (of whom a quarter were
French). D'Arco had orders to entrench the hill above the town as rapidly
as might be and to defend it from attack; for whoever held the
Schellenberg was master of Donauwoerth below. But the Elector could only
spare eight guns for this purpose from his inferior forces.

Upon the 2nd of July, in the early morning, Marlborough, by one of those
rapid movements which were a prime element in his continuous success,
marched before dawn with something between seven and eight thousand
infantry carefully chosen for the task and thirty-five squadrons of horse
for the attack on the Schellenberg. It was Marlborough's alternate day of
command.

With all his despatch, he could not arrive on the height of the hill nor
attack its imperfect but rapidly completing works until the late
afternoon. It is characteristic of his generalship that he risked an
assault with this advance body of his without waiting for the main part of
the army under the Duke of Baden to come up. With sixteen battalions only,
of whom a third were British, he attempted to carry works behind which a
force equal to his own in strength was posted. The risk was high, for he
could hardly hope to carry the works with such a force, and all depended
upon the main body coming up in time. There was but an hour or two of
daylight left.

The check which Marlborough necessarily received in such an attempt
incidentally gave proof of the excellent material of his troops. More than
a third of these fell in the first furious and undecided hour. They failed
to carry the works. They had already once begun to break and once again
rallied, but had suffered no final dissolution under the ordeal--though it
was both the first to which the men were subjected during this campaign,
and probably also the most severe of any they were to endure.

Whether they, or indeed any other troops, could long have survived such
conditions as an attempt to storm works against equal numbers is not open
to proof; for, while the issue was still doubtful (but the advantage
naturally with the force behind the trenches), the mass of the army under
the Duk