d it as "an international impertinence." In recent years it
has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin
America. Until recently no American writers appear to have considered
the real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is
it that without an army and until recent years without a navy of any
size we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described as
an impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe?
Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an
inherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it. In
view of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired,
during the early stages of the late war, this explanation will not hold
good and some other must be sought. Americans have been so little
concerned with international affairs that they have failed to see any
connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in
Europe. The existence of a European balance of power is the only
explanation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine for
so long a time without a resort to force. Some one or more of the
European powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff,
that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it,
had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became
engaged with us some other European power would attack them in the
rear. A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis.

The most serious strain to which the Monroe Doctrine was ever subjected
was the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War to
establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices. He
was clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861
for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects
against the government of Mexico. Before the joint intervention had
gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleon
had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. Napoleon's Mexican
venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern
Confederacy. Hence, his friendly relations with the Confederate
commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy and
Maximilian backed by the power of France. Against each successive step
taken by France in Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State,
protested. As the Civil War drew to a successful c