red the President that a bill had been
introduced in the Reichstag to alter the constitution of the Empire so
as to give the representatives of the people the right to decide for
war or peace, but the President was not satisfied that there had been
any real change. "It may be that future wars have been brought under
the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and
it is with the present war that we are dealing." He was not willing to
accept any armistice which did not make a renewal of hostilities on the
part of Germany impossible. If, he concluded, the United States "must
deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany
now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to
the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not
peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving
this essential thing unsaid." This note was written October 23. Four
days later the Chancellor replied: "The President knows the deep-rooted
changes which have taken place and are still taking place in German
constitutional life. The peace negotiations will be conducted by a
People's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in
accordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will
also be subject. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an
armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President
in his manifestations has described."

The terms of the Armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council at
Versailles and completed by November 5. They were much more severe
than the public had expected them to be. Germany was required
immediately to evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and
Luxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the left
bank of the Rhine, and from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and
Turkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery and
airplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers,
and destroyers. This was practically unconditional surrender.
Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that Foch
and Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germany
would not accept them. They wanted an armistice that Germany would
accept. General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "the
complete disarmament and demobilization of the military and naval
forces of the enemy." In Ameri