royers, submarines, or aircraft. Italy accepted the same
ratio as France.

Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed. As a result, the
treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if
they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial
warfare. As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as Sir
Percy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe that
the capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the
future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface
ships. The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval
treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship as
obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their
submarine and aircraft programs. There is no limitation upon the
building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10,000 tons
displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches.

By Article 19 of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain, and
Japan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications and
naval bases in the islands of the Pacific with certain exceptions,
notably the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand. This
agreement relieves Japan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hope
that it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of
1817 between the United States and Great Britain for disarmament on the
Great Lakes.

The 5-5-3 ratio puts the navies of Great Britain, the United States,
and Japan, for the present at least, on a strictly defensive basis.
Each navy is strong enough to defend its home territory, but no one of
them will be able to attack the home territory of the others. Of
course it is possible that the development of aircraft and submarines,
together with cruisers and other surface craft, may eventually alter
the situation. Hitherto navies have existed for two purposes: national
defense and the enforcement of foreign policies. The new treaty means
that as long as it lasts the navies of the ratifying powers can be used
for defense only and not for the enforcement of their policies in
distant quarters of the globe. In other words, when disputes arise,
British policies will prevail in the British area, American policies in
the American area, and Japanese policies in the Japanese area. Having
agreed to place ourselves in a position in which we cannot attack
Japan, the only